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NOTES
TAXATION: DISALLOWANCE OF EXEMPTION ON CHARITABLE TRUST INCOME
NOT IMMEDIATELY DISTRIBUTED TO BENEFICIARY
Should the trustee of a charitable trust distribute trust income to the bene-
ficiaries in order to take advantage of an exemption from federal income tax-
ation when he knows there is a possibility that the power of appointment under
which the settlor created the trust may be held invalid? At first glance the obvious
solution to this dilemma is for the trustee to accumulate the income during the
pendency of the litigation and pay the taxes. If the exercise of the power of
appointment is subsequently held valid, a claim for refund can be filed to recover
the taxes paid. This latter course of action was taken in the case of Fidelity
Trust Co. v. United States.' But the claim for refund was denied.
The courts face difficult problems in deciding when a specific item of income
falls within the charitable exemptions from federal taxation. The Fidelity Trust
case is no exception. The facts were as follows: A's will created a testamentary
trust from which A's widow was to receive the net income for life, and A's son, B,
was given a power of appointment over a portion of the trust corpus. B died prior
to the death of the widow, the first life tenant, exercising his power of appointment
by will. He appointed two-thirds of the net income from his portion of the corpus
to qualified charities. The validity of the appointment was challenged on the
ground that B's life interest in his share being conditioned on his surviving the
widow the same condition applied to his power of appointment. Because of this
contest the trustee after the widow's death withheld distribution of income from
B's share until the contest was adjudicated. He noted on the 1952 tax return that
the income had not been distributed because of the dispute. No deduction was
claimed. Upon the finding of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the appoint-
ment was valid, the condition of B's surviving the widow applying only to his share
of income and not to his testamentary power over the principal,2 the income was
distributed to the charities, and the trustee sought to recover the income tax which
had been paid.
The Internal Revenue Code section controlling the decision provided that:3
... there shall be allowed as a deduction any part of the gross income, without limita-
tion, which pursuant to the terms of the will or deed creating the trust, is during the
taxable year paid or permanently set aside for . . . or is to be used exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes .... (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that this section of the 1939 code was not substantially changed
by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The 1939 code governed Fidelity because
the tax year in question was prior to the adoption of the 1954 code. Thus the
decision in Fidelity may be used to interpret the newer section.
The Court of Appeals held4 in Fidelity that the money was not "permanently
set aside" for the charities during the tax period, within the meaning of the code,
because the validity of the execution of the power of appointment had been chal-
1253 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1958).
2 1n re Walker's Estate, 376 Pa. 16, 101 A.2d 652 (1954).
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 162(a), 53 Stat. 66 (substantially unchanged by INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 642(c)).
4 253 F.2d at 409.
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lenged and the trustee had not committed himself. The alternative requirement
of the code section, that the income be used "exclusively" for charitable purposes,
was not considered by the court. Apparently this was because part of the income
would have gone to the persons contesting the exercise of the power of appoint-
ment had such appointment been declared invalid.
The court relied on two cases to support its decision that the taxpayer, by
merely accumulating the income, had not brought himself within the statutory re-
quirements for the exemption.
The first case mentioned by the court, United States v. Akin,5 did not deal with
charitable exemptions at all, but rather with deductions for business expenses.
Akin does support the propositions that a taxpayer must comply strictly with a
specific provision in the Internal Revenue Code to earn a valid exemption from
taxation and that the deduction is a matter of legislative grace.6 It is clear that
provisions in internal revenue statutes granting special privileges for business
exemptions are strictly construed in favor of the taxing authority,7 but it is ques-
tionable whether this policy should apply to charitable exemptions which are
deemed to be in the general public interest. The policy applied to charitable ex-
emptions is illustrated by a statement made in Home Oil Mill v. Willingham:8
While the general rule of law is that in cases of doubt, exemption provisions of tax
statutes are to be construed strictly and are to be resolved in favor of the taxing power,
an exception exists in the case of provisions exempting charitable . . . organizations.
In cases of such exemptions, the rule of liberal construction is to be applied.
The other case cited by the court, Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. v.
Comm'r,9 is also distinguishable on its facts from Fidelity Trust. There the trust
instrument required that payments to charities be made from net income not re-
quired for specified non-charitable purposes. As the income might have been in-
adequate for the non-charitable purposes in a given tax year, the court held'0
that the income was not, pursuant to the terms of the trust deed, to be "paid or
permanently set aside" exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of
the Internal Revenue Code.
In contrast to the requirement of inevitability of enjoyment of the charitable
gifts without recourse to the trust corpus, laid down in the Bank of America case,
is the requirement announced in Comm'r v. F. G. Bonfils Trust." There a deduc-
tion from gross income under section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code12 was
held allowable if, under the particular facts, there was no reasonable possibility
that the corpus of the trust would be invaded.'8 Bonfils thus represents a liberal
interpretation of the statute when contrasted with the strict interpretation in
Bank of America.
The Bonfils decision emphasizes that Congress intended section 162 of the
5 248 F.2d 742 (loth Cir. 1957).
6 Id. at 743.7 Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Comm'r, 321 U.S. 560 (1944).
8 68 F. Supp. 525, 530 (N.D. Ala. 1945); see Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934);
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
0 126 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1942).
'ld. at 52.
1'115 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1940).
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1934, § 162(a), 48 Stat. 728 (same as Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 162 (a) ; see note 3 supra).
13 115 F.2d at 792.
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Internal Revenue Act of 1934, which is similar to the Revenue Act of 1939, to
encourage charitable gifts and not to hinder them.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also liberally construed section
162 and similar sections to fulfill this legislative intent,1 4 holding in Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Comm'r1 5 that income may be received in one tax year and paid out
for charitable contributions in another tax year. The charitable exemption was
allowed under section 162 although actual distribution of the income had been
deferred until a later tax period. 16
In the light of the Old Colony decision, it is interesting to compare a recent
case, Emanuelson v. United States,17 with its contemporary, Fidelity Trust. The
controversy in Emanuelson dealt with two wills which had been executed at dif-
ferent times. The first will devised part of the residue of the testator's estate to
charities. Under the second will, no part of the residue was devised to charity. A
compromise agreement was reached by the beneficiaries of the two wills, which
provided that part of the residue should vest in accordance with the first will. Fol-
lowing the compromise agreement the charities received their share of the residue
in addition to their share of the net income of the estate. The court allowed recov-
ery of the income taxes paid prior to the compromise agreement which allowed
distribution of the income to the charities. The decision was based on section
162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,18 as was Fidelity Trust. The court
held in Emanuelson that the income accumulated prior to the compromise agree-
ment was "paid or permanently set aside" for charitable purposes during the
taxable year within the meaning of section 162. The reasoning was that the com-
promise agreement stood in place of the will and related back to the time of the
testator's death. 19
Emanuelson pointed out that there was an alternate basis for granting an
exemption under section 162, by citing Charles P. Moorman Home for Women v.
United States,20 which held that the tax exemption was properly granted not only
when the income had been paid to or permanently set aside for charitable pur-
poses during the taxable year, but also when the income received during the tax-
able year was to be used exclusively for the charitable purpose by the terms of the
trust instrument.21 This meant that under these circumstances the phrase "during
the taxable year" was not a condition to the granting of an exemption. An analogy
can be drawn between Fidelity and Moorman. In Fidelity the income received
during the taxable year was to be used exclusively for the charitable purpose by
the terms of the trust instrument, although the trustee was compelled to postpone
the distribution of income for two years because of the intervening dispute.
The reasoning of Emanuelson could well apply to Fidelity Trust. In Emanuel-
son, the court held that the income was permanently set aside as the compromise
agreement stood in place of the will, and thus, in effect, related back to the time
of the decedent's death. Similarly, in Fidelity Trust, the appointed interests of the
14 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 301 U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Provident
Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934) ; Lederer v. Stockton, 260 US. 3 (1922).
15 301 U.S. 379 (1937).
16 Id. at 384.
17 159 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1958).
Is See note 3 supra.
19 Middleton v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Penn. 1951).
20 42 F.2d 257 (W.D. Ky. 1930).
2 1 d. at 261.
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